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For this court truly is a monster, and it is a monster that must be slain.'
INTRODUCTION
On July 17, 1998, one hundred twenty nations voted in favor of
creating a powerful international court2 that would be able to prose-
cute individuals for genocide,3 crimes against humanity,
4 war crimes, 5
and aggression.' The International Criminal Court ("ICC") will enter
into force when sixty countries ratify the Rome Statute of the Inter-
national Criminal Court ("Rome Treaty").' The ICC will be the last
major international institution created in this millennium 8
1. Hearing on the Creation of an International Criminal Court Before the
Subcommittee on International Operations of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
105th Cong. (1998) [hereinafter 1998 Hearing] (statement by Senator Rod Grams)
(emphasizing the importance of opposition to the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court ("Rome Treaty")).
2. See United Nations Press Release: UN Diplomatic Conference Concludes
in Rome with Decision to Establish Permanent International Criminal Court (July
17, 1998) (visited Sept. 6, 1998) <http://www.un.org/icc/> [hereinafter United Na-
tions Press Release] (explaining the unrecorded vote as 120-7, with twenty-one
abstentions, in favor of adopting the Treaty).
3. See infra Part II.B. 1 (discussing the Rome Treaty's definition of genocide
as "committing acts with the intent to destroy in whole or in part a national, ethni-
cal, racial or religious group").
4. See infra Part II.B.2 (introducing the Rome Treaty's definition of crimes
against humanity as crimes committed "as part of widespread or systematic attack
directed against any civilian population with knowledge of the attack").
5. See infira Part II.B.3 (presenting the Rome Treaty's definition of war crimes
as acts "committed as part of a plan or policy or as a large scale commission of
such crimes").
6. See infra Part II.B.4 (analyzing the inclusion of aggression in the Rome
Treaty). Although the delegates at the Rome Treaty did not define aggression, this
section bases its analysis on the definition set out in the 1991 ILC Draft Code of
Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind. See 1991 Draft Code On
Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, art. 16, in SUNGA infra note
29, at 346 (defining aggression as "the use of armed force by a State against the
sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in
any manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations").
7. See U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenopolentiaries on the Establishment
of an International Criminal Court, Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, art. 126, U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.183/9 (1998) [hereinafter Rome Treaty]
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The significance of the creation of the ICC is immense,' since the
end of World War II, the international community has not been able
to prosecute those responsible for massive human rights abuses."'
Since there has never been an international court able to try individu-
als, the international community has been unable to prosecute such
notorious human rights abusers as Idi Amin and Pol Pot." Many na-
tions, therefore, consider the ICC the missing component of an ef-
fective international legal system.'2 Proponents of the ICC believe
that this court, established on the fiftieth anniversary of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights,'" will greatly deter human rights vio-
lators. 4 Despite the good intentions behind the establishment of the
(discussing the requirements for the Rome Treaty's entry into force).
8. See Mary Robinson, A Permanent International Criminal Court At Last,
INT'L HERALD TRIB., June 15, 1998, at 10 (discussing how the ICC will be the
culmination of the fifty-year endeavor to build institutions that protect human
rights).
9. See United Nations Press Release, supra note 2 (remarking that many dele-
gates believe that the ICC is a "giant step in the history of mankind").
10. See Kofi Annan, Statement by the United Nations Secretar.-General at the
Ceremony Held at Campidoglio Celebrating the Adoption of the Statute of the In-
ternational Criminral Court (July 18, 1998) (visited Sept. 6, 1998) <http://
www.un.org/icc> (declaring that until the creation of the Rome Treaty, powerful
leaders knew they could get away with committing crimes against humanity be-
cause there was no international court to judge them).
11. See Robinson, supra note 8, at 10 (noting that in the last fifty years it was
easier to escape accountability for murdering 100,000 people instead ofjust one).
12. See Conference on Establishing an International Criminal Court Con-
cludes Four Days of General Statements, M2 PRESSWIRE, June 19, 1998, available
in 1998 WL 12975656 (statement of Frank Jensen, Minister of Denmark) (arguing
that there should be an international court that acts the same way as a national jus-
tice system); see also Diplomatic Conference Begins General Statements on the
Establishment of a Criminal Court, M2 PRESSWIRE, June 17, 1998, available in
1998 WL 12975145 (statement of Tony Lloyd, United Kingdom Minister of State)
(remarking that if there were an effective permanent international court, it would
make the world more just, safe, and peaceful); see id. (statement of Mary Robin-
son, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights) (suggesting that the
ICC provides the world with a chance to overcome the past atrocities and establish
a court that will not only be effective but will demand universal respect).
13. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217(a)(I 11), U.N.
Doe. A/810 (1948).
14. See Gerhard Hafner, Statement on Behalf of the European Union Delivered
by Acting Head of Austrian Delegation in the Committee of the f'hole (July 17,
1998) (visited Sept. 6, 1998) <http://wxvw.un.org/icc> (commenting that the Euro-
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ICC, serious concerns remain regarding the text of the Rome
Treaty.'5 The United States, in particular, is concerned that creation
of the ICC may substantially affect the United States and its citizens
regardless of whether it chooses to ratify the Rome Treaty. 
6
This comment explores the Rome Treaty and evaluates the impact
it could have on the United States-with or without the country's
ratification. Part I of this comment explores the background of the
ICC, particularly the historical use of international tribunals and the
international legal concepts included in the Rome Treaty. Part II
evaluates the Rome Treaty itself, in terms of its constitutionality and
the language setting forth the crimes under its jurisdiction. This sec-
tion also addresses the United States' concern that the ICC will be a
politically-motivated institution. Part III presents and analyzes the
solutions available to the United States concerning the Rome Treaty.
Finally, this comment recommends that the United States should not
sign, ratify, or tacitly accept the Rome Treaty unless the international
community significantly amends it.
pean Union hopes that the Rome Treaty will deter brutality and savagery).
15. See Eli Nathan, Statement by the Head of the Delegation of Israel (July 17,
1998) (visited Sept. 6, 1998) <http://www.un.org/icc> (arguing that the Treaty is
flawed in its enumeration of serious crimes because it includes the transportation
of a population into occupied territory); see also Dilip Lahiri, Remarks Explaining
the Vote on the Adoption of the Statute of the International Court (July 17, 1998)
(visited Sept. 6, 1998) <http://www.un.org/icc> (characterizing the scope of the
ICC as too broad and easily used for political purposes); S. REP. No. 103-71, at
104 (1993) (statement by the American Bar Association) (listing the arguments
against the ICC). But see Leila Sadat Wexler, The Proposed Permanent Interna-
tional Court: An Appraisal, 29 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 665, 705-14 (1996) (discussing
the duty that governments owe to citizens who suffer from international crimes not
to argue over legal technicalities when they are of "no importance in the long
run"). These governments have a responsibility to establish an impartial, credible,
and independent adjudicatory institution. See id.
16. See generally David J. Scheffer, Remarks at News Conference (July 3 1,
1998), available in 1998 WL 431804 (discussing the effects the Rome Treaty may
have on the United States). See 1998 Hearing, supra note I (statement by Sen.
Jesse Helms) (threatening that the United States will renegotiate military agree-
ments when the Rome Treaty enters into force to protect American soldiers); see
also James Podgers, War Crimes Court Under Fire, 84 A.B.A. J. 64 (1998) (ex-
plaining the United States' concern that American troops serving in foreign coun-
tries would be subject to the Rome Treaty).
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I. BACKGROUND OF THE ICC
There is a significant amount of history leading up to the estab-
lishment of a permanent tribunal to adjudicate international crimes.'
In the late nineteenth century, the Franco-Prussian War atrocities
hastened the calls for an international criminal court." Later, after
World War II, the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials prosecuted many
perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against humanity, thereby re-
newing this concept.'9 It appeared that a permanent criminal court
was a step closer to reality when, in 1948, the Genocide Convention"
called for a permanent tribunal.2' The Cold War, however, delayed
the creation of this type of institution.2'
17. See Bryan F. MacPherson, Building an Iternational Crinminal Court ibr
the 21st Century, 13 CONN. J. INT'L L. 1, 3-14 (1998) (explaining how history has
shaped the international community's view on the potential for a permanent inter-
national tribunal).
18. See Carroll Bogert, Pol Pot's Enduring Lesson, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1998.
at 16 (discussing that in 1870-71, the gruesome atrocities of the Franco-Prussian
war prompted the international community to call for an international tribunal to
try the perpetrators).
19. See Brian Mitchell, One Court for all the lorld?. INVESTOR'S DAILY, July
16, 1998, at Al (discussing the Nuremberg legacy). Many proponents of the ICC
have compared it to the Nuremberg Tribunals following World War II. See ihL But
see Gary T. Dempsey, Reasonable Doubt: The Case Against the Proposed Inter-
national Criminal Court (last modified July 16, 1998) <http://www.cato.org/> (ar-
guing that the Nuremberg Tribunal is different from the ICC because the Nurem-
berg Tribunal followed an unconditional military and political surrender, the
defendants were in custody, the evidence was readily available, and the allies
shared a common vision of what the post-occupation government should look
like). At the Nuremberg trials, the Allies tried twenty-two Nazi leaders both for
waging an aggressive war and crimes against humanity. See id. The British and
American leaders, however, were not accused of crimes against humanity for kill-
ing 35,000 civilians in the Dresden firebombing and 100,000 civilians in Hi-
roshima and Nagasaki. See id.
20. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention] (calling for
an international penal tribunal to try offenders).
21. See Ilia B. Levitine, Constitutional Aspects of an International Criminal
Court, 9 N.Y.L. INT'L L. REv. 27, 36 (1996) (disclosing that the United States re-
jected establishing a Genocide Convention permanent court for reasons of political
feasibility).
22. See MacPherson, supra note 17, at 12 (discussing how the easing of the
Cold War renewed interest in an permanent international tribunal).
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As a result of an increase in internal strife at the end of this cen-
tury, the face of conflict has changed.23 Consequently, in the wars of
ethnicity and nationalism, there have been tremendous civilian casu-
alties.14 The massive human rights abuses of the Bosnia-Herzegovina
and Rwanda conflicts in the early 1990s represent this change in
warfare.25 The atrocities committed in both countries led to world
outcry, demanding that the perpetrators of these crimes be brought to
justice.2 ' Thus, the United Nations Security Council responded to the
conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda by ordering the crea-
tion of ad hoc tribunals to try the accused.
2 7
Nevertheless, the United Nations wanted to find a more permanent
solution instead of resorting to ad hoc tribunals.28 Since the ad hoc
23. See David J. Scheffer, International Judicial Intervention, FOREIGN POL'Y,
Mar. 1, 1996, at 34 (listing numerous recent occurrences of internal strife). Recent
examples of conflict include: the Iraqi assault against its Kurdish and Shiite popu-
lations and the invasion of Kuwait; ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and Croatia; geno-
cide in Burundi and Rwanda; genocide in Cambodia; and widespread terror and
murder in Angola, Chechnya, Ethiopia, Haiti, Liberia, Somalia and Sri Lanka. See
id. (announcing that together these atrocities spark the call for international reme-
dies); see also Barbara Crossette, Violation: An Old Scourge of War Becomes Its
Latest Crime, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1998, at 4:1 (explaining the prevalence of at-
tacks on civilians).
24. See Crossette, supra note 23, at 4:1 (remarking that modem wars are fought
in neighborhoods rather than on battlefields). As a result, a new style of warfare
has emerged targeting women in organized sexual assaults as a means of terroriz-
ing and humiliating the civilian population. See id.
25. See McCormack, supra note 23, at 638 (describing the ethnic cleansing and
mass atrocities in the Balkans); Rwanda War Crimes (National Public Radio "All
Things Considered" radio broadcast Sept. 2, 1998) (discussing the genocide in
Rwanda that left 500,000 people dead).
26. See MacPherson, supra note 17, at 13-14 (explaining how the media's por-
trayal of the mass human rights violations in Bosnia and Rwanda stimulated the
international community's response).
27. See Scheffer, supra note 23 (characterizing ad hoc tribunals as an emerging
trend in international judicial intervention); see also Serious War Crimes Should
Be Dealt With By Permanent Criminal Court, Says Justice Richard Goldstone, 33
UN CHRON. 35 (1996), available in 1996 WL 10924350 (discussing how the ad
hoc tribunals are the first attempt to enforce international humanitarian law and
how they mark a milestone in international law). The Security Council created
each ad hoc tribunal as a chapter VII United Nations entity. See Scheffer, supra
note 23.
28. See Christopher Blakesley, Article: Report of the International Law Asso-
ciation, 25 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 233, 240 (1997) (stating that ad hoc tribu-
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tribunals were limited to the jurisdiction of their respective countries,
the United Nations recognized that it would be too costly to create an
ad hoc tribunal for every internal conflict where there are claims of
human rights violations. 9 In December 1995, the General Assembly
established the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of a
Criminal Court.0 Using the International Law Commission's draft
statute3' as a basis for discussion, the Preparatory Committee met
several times in the past few years, modifying and adjusting the draft
statute, which resulted in the July 1998 Rome Treaty.':
The international community argues that the ICC has several pur-
poses.33 First, the ICC should stand as a deterrent." The ICC, by its
very creation, is supposed to encourage individuals-from a coun-
try's leader to the common soldier-to realize that they will be held
accountable for their actions." Second, the ICC should complement
nals are limited in both time and scope); see also Scheffer, supra note 23 (dis-
cussing the Security Council's "tribunal fatigue"--the lack of enthusiasm for cre-
ating and financing a new court every time there is outrage about crimes against
humanity).
29. See LYAL S. SUNGA, THE EMERGING SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW: DEVELOPMENTS IN CODIFICATION AND IMPLEMENTATION 6 (1997)
(explaining that the United Nations created ad hoc tribunals to address factual
situations specific to each country).
30. See G.A. Res. 50/46, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/Res/50!46
(1995) (charging the committee with preparing an acceptable text for an interna-
tional criminal court).
31. See Report of the International Law Comnission on the Work of its Fory-
Sixth Session: Draft Statute of an hternational Court, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess.,
Agenda Item 140, U.N. Doc. A/49/355 (1994) [hereinafter Draft Statute].
32. See Rome Treaty, supra note 7.
33. See Wexler, supra note 15, at 708-14 (listing potential justifications for the
ICC). The side effects of increased globalization of trade is one such justification.
See id. at 708. Another justification, according to Wexler, is that domestic courts
often lack experience to prosecute international crimes. See id. at 706, 710.
34. See Bogert, supra note 18, at 16 (analyzing the deterrence theory of the
ICC). But see 1998 Hearing, supra note 1 (statement of Sen. Rod Grams) (ex-
plaining why the ICC will not work as a deterrent). Grams argued that ICC indict-
ments will not dissuade leaders such as Saddam Hussein any more than Radovan
Karazic and Ratko Mladic were deterred by the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia ("ICTY") indictments when they undertook the massacre of
Srebenica. See id.
35. See Wexler, supra note 15, at 711 (asserting that legal accountability brings
about deterrence); see also Claudio Grossman et al., International Support/br In-
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national criminal judicial systems when they fail. 6 In a country
where the internal mechanism to try perpetrators of heinous crimes
has failed, the ICC would have jurisdiction to prosecute these peo-
ple.37 Finally, the establishment of the ICC will provide a permanent
record for the survivors of such atrocities."
The Rome Treaty is precedent-setting for several reasons. First,
the Rome Treaty signifies the fusion of international law and crimi-
nal law." The ICC enforces criminal law, which traditionally is a
domestic matter, at the supranational level. 40 The Rome Treaty ex-
emplifies the growing trend of implementing international remedies
for human rights violations. Second, the Rome Treaty also com-
ternational Criminal Tribunals and an International Criminal Court, 13 AM. U.
INT'L L. REV. 1413, 1431 (presentation by Gabrielle Kirk MacDonald, Judge and
President of the ICTY) ("For the abused, forgiveness is possible only when they
know, and in exceptional circumstances, understand the reasons for their suffering.
For the abusers, forgiveness is possible only when they accept accountability.")
36. See World Criminal Court Questions: An Interview With Ambassador
David J. Scheffer (National Public Radio "All Things Considered" radio broadcast,
July 15, 1998), available in 1998 WL 3645689 (explaining that the United States is
opposed to specific text in the Draft Statute because in practice the court will be
very different than in theory).
37. See Paul D. Marquardt, Law Without Borders: The Constitutionality of an
International Criminal Court, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 73, 100 (1995) (de-
scribing the role of a permanent international tribunal not only as a last resort, but
as representing legitimacy); Wexler, supra note 15, at 711 (discussing the impor-
tance of the ability of an international tribunal to take over a matter when a na-
t ional criminal justice system proves inadequate).
38. See Wexler, supra note 15, at 712, 714 (suggesting that the ICC can pro-
vide a mechanism that can promptly investigate and prosecute war crimes and
other atrocities). One way to prevent reoccurrence of genocide and state-sponsored
mass brutality is to cultivate and share the memories of enduring horrors. See id. at
715.
39. See S. REP. No. 103-71, at 120 (1993) (statement by M. Cherif Bassiouni,
President, Human Rights Law Institute) (noting that the ICC will combine interna-
tional law with domestic criminal law); see also Kitty Felde et al., The Prosecutor
v. Dusko Tadic, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1441, 1461-62 (presentation by Gabrielle
Kirk MacDonald, Judge and President of the ICTY) (describing the application of
several different legal systems during trials before the ICTY).
40. See Wexler, supra note 15, at 724 (explaining the trend of national offenses
with international consequences and how the ICC will address this trend).
41. See Scheffer, supra note 23 (explaining the need for international remedies
because of the failure to prosecute domestically). The theme of the universal ac-
countability is echoed in the Treaty's preamble. See Rome Treaty, supra note 7,
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bines international human rights law with international humanitarian
law.42 Since these two areas of international law have traditionally
been discrete, it is quite remarkable that the Rome Treaty merges
them into one instrument.43 The Rome Treaty itself provides for a
new international organization that, once it enters into force, will
wield substantial power within the international community. "
II. WHY THE UNITED STATES SHOULD NOT
RATIFY THE ROME TREATY
Since the Rome Treaty has a benevolent purpose, it is not surpris-
ing that it has received tremendous support from many human rights
advocates.4 5 There are, however, factors other than a just purpose that
a country must consider before giving support to an international
Preamble (describing that "all peoples are united by common bonds, their cultures
pieced together in shared heritage, and concerned that this delicate mosaic may be
shattered at any time").
42. See M.J. Peterson, On the hIadequate Reach of Humanitarian and Human
Rights Law and the Needfor a New Instrument, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 589, 589 (1983)
(questioning if there is a "lacuna" where "human rights law meshes with humani-
tarian law"). The individual should be protected by a continuum of norms from
both areas of the law. See id. Although both sectors of international law have ex-
panded immensely in the last fifty years; in the past, the international community
was more willing to accept humanitarian law instruments rather than human rights
instruments as positive law. See id. at 590.
43. See S. REP. No. 103-71, at 120 (statement of M. Cherif Bassiouni, Presi-
dent, Human Rights Law Institute) (observing the erosion of the historical distinc-
tions between international humanitarian law and international human rights law).
44. See 1998 Hearing, supra note I (statement of Sen. Rod Grams) (criticizing
the Treaty as making the ICC more powerful at the expense of the United Nations
Security Council). But see Louise Arbour & Aryeh Neier, Histor, and Future of
the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 13
AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1495, 1503 (presentation by Louise Arbour, Chief Prosecu-
tor, The Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda) ("I do not want to short change history by short changing ourselves for
the capacity to show the true magnitude of criminal organizations or the criminal
drive that is behind these atrocities.").
45. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, JUSTICE IN THE BALA*\NCE:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AN INDEPENDENT AND EFFECTIVE CRIMINAL COURT
(1998) (supporting the creation of the ICC). See United Nations Press Release. su-
pra note 2 (statement by Austrian delegation) (praising the ICC as the opportunity
to take a concrete step towards defeating human rights abuses); see also id. (state-
ment by the South African delegation) (asserting that the ICC will send a clear
message that perpetrators of heinous crimes will not get away with impunity).
1999]
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treaty.46 Specifically, before it gives its support to the ICC, the United
States must weigh the constitutional impact on American citizens,
47
the potential for misinterpretation of the text defining the crimes
within the ICC's jurisdiction,48 and the potential misuses of the or-
ganization. 9
A. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
There are two major constitutional issues implicated by the Rome
Treaty. First, if the United States ratifies the Rome Treaty, the ICC
has the potential to subordinate federal jurisdiction." This dilemma
arises because the ICC would have the power to try United States
nationals for crimes committed within the United States. 2 The Con-
stitution, however, vests sole authority to prosecute and try citizens
for offenses committed within the United States to the state and fed-
eral governments. 3 The "judicial power" of the United States may
not be exercised by a tribunal that is not a court of the United
States. 4 Furthermore, the Rome Treaty does not give countries the
46. See Scheffer, supra note 23 (listing the United States' concerns regarding a
permanent international criminal tribunal).
47. See infra Part II.A (discussing the constitutional issues implicated by the
Rome Treaty).
48. See infra Part II.B (analyzing the crimes and their potential implication on
the United States).
49. See infra Part II.C (critiquing the Rome Treaty's potential for politiciza-
tion).
50. See 1998 Hearing, supra note 1 (statement by Lee A. Casey & David B.
Rivkin, Jr.) (listing the constitutional objections to the ICC).
51. See 1998 Hearing, supra note I (statement by Lee A. Casey & David B.
Rivkin, Jr.) (emphasizing that the court's jurisdiction covers offenses that may take
place domestically, thus infringing upon the legislative and judicial authority of the
United States).
52. See id. (describing how the international community could question certain
uses of force by the United States government against its citizens).
53. See id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. III, sec. 1 ("The judicial power of the
United States shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as
the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."); U.S. CONST. amend.
X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohib-
ited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.")
54. See 1998 Hearing, supra note 1 (statement by Lee A. Casey & David B.
Rivkin, Jr.) (citing Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 119-21 (1866)).
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opportunity to rectify potential constitutional issues, such as this one,
by allowing any reservations to the treaty.5"
Second, the Rome Treaty lacks a crucial link to the Bill of565'
Rights. The right to a trial by jury," a fundamental right of Ameri-
can citizens, is not mentioned in the Rome Treaty." Moreover, the
Rome Treaty does not provide protections against privacy, such as
unlawful searches and seizures. 9 These provisions, which are fun-
damental to the American legal system, are noticeably absent from
the Rome Treaty.60
55. See Rome Treaty, supra note 7, art. 120 (forbidding reservations to the
Treaty); see also irfra notes 151-156 and accompanying text (describing the need
for reservations to the Treaty).
56. See 1998 Hearings, supra note 1 (statement by Sen. John Ashcroft) (noting
that the proposed court does not guarantee or reflect the Bill of Rights); see also id.
(statement by Lee A. Casey & David B. Rivkin, Jr.) (concluding that the Bill of
Rights is not guaranteed in the Rome Treaty). In addition, the ICC does not guard
the Sixth Amendment's right to a speedy trial. See id. (statement by Lee A. Casey
& David B. Rivkin, Jr.) (finding that the Rome Treaty does not guarantee the same
level of protection as the Sixth Amendment).
57. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
58. See Rome Treaty, supra note 7, art. 67 (omitting the right to trial by jury as
an enumerated right); see also 1998 Hearing, supra note 1 (statement by Lee A.
Casey & David B. Rivkin, Jr.) (describing a right to trial by jury as a "fundamental
check on the use and abuse of power vis-A-vis the individual"). The Sixth Amend-
ment distinctly protects this right by requiring that "[iln all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury
of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed." U.S.
CONST. amend. VI.
59. See Rome Treaty, supra note 7, art. 69(8) (providing that when the court is
deciding on the relevance or admissibility of evidence, the court should not rule on
the applicability of the State's national law). But see id. art. 69(7)(b) (prohibiting
evidence obtained in violation of the Treaty or internationally recognized human
rights if the evidence would "seriously damage the integrity of the hearings").
60. See Major William K. Lietzau, A Comity of Errors: Ignoring the Constitu-
tional Rights of Service Members, 1996 ARMY LAW. 3, 8 (1996) (reporting that the
strength of the United States is grounded in individual liberty and the rule of law).
But see HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 45, at 147 (emphasizing that national
laws should not be used to restrict the ICC). There are, however, protections inher-
ent in the Treaty: Article 20 (creating a clause to prevent double jeopardy); Article
24 (establishing that one cannot be tried for crimes that occurred before the Treaty
enters into force); Article 55 (listing basic rights of the accused during an investi-
gation); Article 66 (providing for an presumption of innocence); and Article 67
(detailing the rights of the accused). See Rome Treaty, supra note 7.
1999]
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In addition to the two constitutional problems discussed above,
there is also a concern with the structural safeguards of the ICC.6"
The international community created the ICC based on a system of
complementarity,62 which imposes a burden on the ICC to determine
that no "just" domestic proceeding exists.63 Proponents of a strong
61. See Marquardt, supra note 37, at 106 n.132 (mentioning the concerns of the
international community that the ICC could become a "sham court").
62. See Rome Treaty, supra note 7, art. 17. The Treaty sets forth the rules on
whether the court may initiate a case in the following manner:
1. The court Shall determine that a case is inadmissible where:
(a)The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction
over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investiga-
tion or prosecution;
(b)The case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it and the
State has decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless the decision resulted
from the unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to prosecute;
(c) The person concerned has already been tried for conduct which is the subject of
the complaint, and a trial by the Court is not permitted under Article 20, paragraph
3;
(d) The case is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the court.
2. In order to determine unwillingness in a particular case, the Court shall consider,
having regard to the principles of due process recognized by international law, whether
one or more of the following exist, as applicable:
(a) The proceedings were or are being undertaken or the national decision was made
for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility for
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court referred to in article 5;
(b) There has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings which in the circum-
stances is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice;
(c) The proceedings were not or are not being conducted independently or impar-
tially, and they were or are being conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances
is, inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice.
3. In order to determine inability in a particular case, the Court shall consider whether,
due to a total or substantial collapse or unavailability of its national judicial system,
the State is unable to obtain the accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or
otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings.
Id.; see also Patricia A. McKeon, Note, An International Criminal Court, Balanc-
ing the Principles of Sovereignty Against the Demands for International Justice, 12
ST. JOHN'SJ. LEGAL COMMENT. 535, 555 (1997) (stating that such a system allows
for the ICC "to complement or take over prosecutions only when national courts
are unwilling or unable to function effectively").
63. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 45, at 70 (finding that this princi-
ple ensures the ICC will not interfere with domestic jurisdiction when a state is
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ICC argue that this safety mechanism will allow the ICC to function
only in situations where a domestic legal system cannot or will not
prosecute human rights violators.' This determination, however,
rests solely on the discretion of the court." Without oversight of this
complementarity provision by a source outside the ICC' the poten-
tial for mishap is great.67 Thus, the principle of complementarity, as
outlined in the Rome Treaty, does very little to protect American
citizens' constitutional rights.'
Furthermore, not only does the Rome Treaty fail to address these
constitutional and safeguards issues, it is also inconsistent with cus-
tomary international law. The Rome Treaty's wording allows the
ICC to prosecute nationals whose country did not ratify the Rome
Treaty.69 As a result, United States armed forces stationed abroad
willing and able to prosecute). But see McKeon, supra note 62, at 555-56 (dis-
cussing that nations fear that a court with too much power will criticize the proce-
dure of national courts).
64. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 45, at 70 (praising the comple-
mentarity principle as safeguarding a state's sovereignty).
65. See Rome Treaty, supra note 7, art. 19(1) (setting forth that "[the Court
shall satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction in any case brought before it").
66. See Rome Treaty, supra note 7, arts. 18, 19, 82 (explaining that a state's
only recourse to challenge the ICC's determination of admissibility is to appeal to
the Appeal Chamber within the ICC).
67. See infra Part III (describing the likelihood of a politicized court); see also
1998 Hearing, supra note 1 (statement by Lee A. Casey & David B. Rivkin, Jr.)
(commenting that this provision is an "open invitation" for the ICC to examine
every decision made by the United States not to prosecute offenses). For example,
many people criticized the United States for only convicting one person responsi-
ble for the massacre at My Lai in Vietnam. See RICHARD LILLICH & HURST
HANNUM, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, PROBLEMS OF LAW, POLICY, AND
PRACTICE 861-62 (3d ed. 1995) (discussing the background and implications of the
Calley case).
68. See Re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 16 (1946) (stating that the Court respects
the laws of war as long as they do not conflict with the laws of Congress or the
Constitution).
69. See Rome Treaty, supra note 7, art. 12. The preconditions to the exercise of
jurisdiction are:
(1) A State which becomes a Party to this Statute thereby accepts the jurisdiction of
the Court with respect to the crimes referred to in article 5.
(2) In the case of article 13, paragraph (a) [referral to the Prosecutor by a State Party]
or (c) [Prosecutor initiates the investigation] the Court may exercise its jurisdiction if
one or more of the following States are Parties to this Statute or have accepted the ju-
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could potentially face prosecution by the ICC for any of the crimes
under its jurisdiction, despite United States opposition to the Rome
Treaty.7° For example, if American soldiers are participating in a
peacekeeping mission in a country that has ratified the Rome Treaty,
the soldiers could be called before the ICC for violations alleged by
that country. 7 Therefore, in this scenario, the ICC would impact the
United States and its citizens even without ratification.7 This goes
against the principle of international law that rejects the notion that
States can be bound by a treaty without consent.73
risdiction of the Court in accordance with paragraph 3:
(a) The State on the territory of which the conduct in question occurred or, if the
crime was committed on board a vessel or aircraft, the State or registration of that
vessel or aircraft;
(b) The State of which the person accused of the crime is a national.
(3) If the acceptance of a State which is not a Party to this Statute is required under
paragraph 2, that State may, by declaration lodged with the Registrar, accept the exer-
cise of jurisdiction by the Court with respect to the crime in question. The accepting
State shall cooperate with the Court without any delay or exception in accordance with
Part 9.
Id. (emphasis added). Thus, Article 12(2) does not require a state to ratify the
Treaty in order for the ICC to hold its nationals accountable. See id.
70. See Scheffer, supra note 16 (comparing the ICC's jurisdiction over nonsig-
natory parties abroad); see also World Criminal Court Questions: An Interview
With Ambassador David J. Scheffer, supra note 36 (mentioning the American
delegation's concern that American law enforcement officials should be the first to
investigate and prosecute any American in question).
71. See 1998 Hearing, supra note I (statement by David J. Scheffer, Ambassa-
dor-at-Large for War Crimes Issues) (criticizing the Rome Treaty text as allowing
multinational peacekeeping forces to come under the jurisdiction of the ICC even
if the soldiers' country did not ratify the Treaty and arguing that this broad juris-
dictional reach conflicts with fundamental principles of treaty law). For example,
this theory would allow two countries to form a treaty and the jurisdiction of the
treaty could extend to the entire world. See id. (explaining the Clinton Administra-
tion's position that official actions of a nonparty state are not subject to the ICC's
jurisdiction if the state does not join the Treaty).
72. See id. (criticizing the Rome Treaty as affecting the United States' ability
to participate in multinational operations, including humanitarian interventions);
see also 1998 Hearing, supra note 1 (statement of Sen. Jesse Helms) (threatening
to renegotiate military agreements).
73. See 1998 Hearing, supra note 1 (statement by Lee A. Casey and David B.
Rivkin, Jr.) (basing this universal principle on the Vienna Convention on Treaties);
see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES sec. 324 (1987) ("An international agreement does not create either obli-
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B. CRIMES WITHIN THE COURT'S JURISDICTION
The Rome Treaty limits the crimes over which it has jurisdiction
to "the most serious crimes of concern to the international commu-
nity as a whole."74 These crimes include genocide,'5 crimes against
humanity,76 war crimes,' and the crime of aggression.7M Although
these crimes are of a grave nature and great importance, " the defini-
tions used in the Rome Treaty are vague and problematic."'
1. Genocide"
The Rome Treaty adopted the Genocide Convention's definition
of genocide," which is still somewhat controversial and creates spe-
gations or rights to a third state without its consent").
74. Rome Treaty, supra note 7, art. 5.
75. See infra Part II.B.1 (analyzing the inclusion of genocide in the Rome
Treaty).
76. See infra Part II.B.2 (analyzing the inclusion of crimes against humanity in
the Rome Treaty).
77. See infra Part II.B.3 (analyzing the inclusion of war crimes in the Rome
Treaty).
78. See infra Part II.B.4 (analyzing the inclusion of aggression in the Rome
Treaty).
79. See 1998 Hearing, supra note 1 (statement of David J. Scheffer, Ambassa-
dor-at-Large for War Crimes Issues) (discussing the responsibility of the interna-
tional community to confront assaults on mankind and bring the perpetrators of
war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity to justice).
80. See McKeon, supra note 62, at 551 (emphasizing the need for concise and
narrow definitions of crimes to eliminate any ambiguities); see also Blakesley, su-
pra note 28, at 254 (criticizing the vagueness of the Draft Statute).
81. See BENJAMIN B. FERENCZ, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A STEP
TOWARDS PEACE 5 (1980) (explaining how Raphel Lemkin coined the term "geno-
cide" as meaning killing of a race/tribe).
82. See Rome Treaty, supra note 7, art. 6; Genocide Convention, supra note 20,
art. H. The Genocide Convention defines genocide as:
any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a na-
tional, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
Killing members of the group;
Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about physi-
cal destruction in whole or in part;
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cific problems.8 ' First, the Genocide Convention omitted political
groups from the types of potentially persecuted groups,84 thus leaving
domestic leaders internationally unaccountable for the disappearance
of their political opponents.85 By adopting the Genocide Conven-
tion's definition, the genocide of political groups could go unpun-
ished. 6 This is unfortunate considering that national leaders often
perpetrate violence against political opponents in order to intimidate
and force them into submission.
Second, the Genocide Convention left "cultural genocide"8 out of
the definition."9 Since Article 121 of the Rome Treaty allows for
Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Id.
83. See STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG
LEGACY 31 (1997) (mentioning that the Genocide Convention does not address the
attributes that define a "group" and there is a flimsy distinction between racial and
ethnic groups).
84. See id. at 33 (explaining the opposition to the inclusion of political groups
as based upon the fact that political groups do not have stable and permanent at-
tributes).
85. See id. at 41 (arguing that it is possible that Saddam Hussein's defense to
his campaign against the Iraqi Kurds could be that the victims were his political
opponents).
86. See Rome Treaty, supra note 7, art. 6 (defining the protected groups as na-
tional, ethnical, racial, or religious). But see RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 82, at
33 (mentioning that perhaps the arena of human rights would be a more appropri-
ate place to deal with attacks on political groups).
87. See Klaus Kinkel, Rare Chance to Make the World Safer, More Just,
BALTIMORE SUN, June 23, 1998, at 13A (stressing the need for an international
criminal justice system to prevent, among other things, the mass execution of po-
litical opponents). See, e.g., Melvin L.M. Mbao, Zambia; Our Shared Aspirations,
AFR. NEWS SERV., Sept. 7, 1998 (noting that African countries are notorious for
summary executions, involuntary detentions, and disappearances of political oppo-
nents); U.S. Committee for Refugees Statement on Congo/Zaire, U.S. NEWSWIRE,
Aug. 7, 1998 (discussing the Committee's plea to the leader of Congo to stop the
mass detention of political opponents).
88. See Richard D. Bilder & Felice D. Gaer, Book Review: Genocide: Con-
ceptual & Historical Dimensions, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 855, 857 (1995) (defining
cultural genocide as the "suppression of culture, religion and language of the tar-
geted group, leading to its forced assimilation rather than its physical destruction").
89. See Matthew Lippman, The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
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amendments seven years after its entry into force,' there is the possi-
bility that cultural genocide may be added to the list of prosecutable
offenses 9-a scenario that may affect the United States. During the
discussions at the Genocide Convention, the United States expressed
opposition to the inclusion of cultural genocide. 2 There are forms of
discrimination still prevalent in the United States,' and some schol-
ars argue that the United States is guilty of perpetrating cultural
genocide against certain minority groups.'
of the Crime of Genocide: Fifo, Years Later, 15 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 415,
458 (1998) (discussing that many countries feared that the international community
would interpret "cultural genocide" as prohibiting the assimilation of minority
groups). A preliminary draft of the Genocide Convention defined cultural genocide
as forbidding prohibited groups from using their own language in daily interactions
and in schools, and from printing and circulating publications in their own lan-
guage. See id. Although the United Nations left "cultural genocide" out of the
Genocide Convention, the United States took over thirty-five years to ratify the
Convention, and even then, the Senate attached a number of reservations and un-
derstandings. See Levitine, supra note 21, at 36 (explaining that the delay in the
ratification of the Genocide Convention was a result of some opposition to the
Convention by influential organizations and individual senators).
90. See Rome Treao,, supra note 7, art. 12 1.
91. See id.
92. See Lippman, supra note 89, at 479 (describing the United States opposi-
tion to the inclusion of cultural genocide in the convention). Many countries feared
that the inclusion of cultural genocide would be interpreted as prohibiting the as-
similation of minority groups. See id. at 458. In particular, the United States feared
that the international community could perceive some of their domestic and for-
eign policies as perpetrating a cultural genocide. See, e.g.. id. at 476-78 (discussing
the possibility that the United States' involvement in Vietnam could be the subject
matter of a claim of cultural genocide). But see M. Cherif Bassiouni et al., War
Crimes Tribunals: The Record and the Prospects: Conference Convocation, 13
AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1383, 1396 (presentation by David J. Scheffer, United States
Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues) (explaining that the United States
supports the inclusion of genocide in the Rome Treaty).
93. See, e.g., David M. Osterfeld, Book Review: Plastic Indians. Nazis and
Genocide: A Perspective on America's Treatment of Indian Nations, 22 AM.
INDIAN L. REv. 623, 632 (1998) (arguing that the United States government con-
tinues to subject Indians to considerable discrimination and genocidal tactics aimed
at removing Indian culture, heritage, and sovereignty).
94. See Rhona K.M. Smith, The International Impact of Creative Problem
Solving: Resolving the Plight ofhIdigenous Peoples, 34 CAL. W. L. REV. 411, 414
(1998) (identifying examples of modem cultural genocide). For example, many
scholars argue that the loss of identity of indigenous people is cultural genocide.
See id.; see also Mark A. Michaels, Indigenous Ethics and Alien Laws: Native
Traditions and the United States Legal Systen, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1565, 1569-
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Third, the Genocide Convention and the Rome Treaty define
genocide as an "act intended to destroy a group in whole or in part."5
Scholars disagree about the size of a "part" of the group.9 6 This is
significant because one can interpret "part" as a portion of an entire
population, such as a million people, or as a small border village
comprised of fifty people.97 This disparity in interpretation could lead
to a non-uniform system of prosecution.9
Finally, the vagueness of the definition of genocide makes difficult
the subjective determination of the "intent" requirement.9 " It will
therefore be hard for a prosecutor to prove that one intended to
commit genocide'" because of the differing opinions on whether ac-
70 (1998) (arguing that the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988 represents a
new form of cultural genocide). Critics also accuse the United States of perpetrat-
ing cultural genocide against African Americans by allowing interracial adoptions.
See Julie C. Lythcott-Haims, Note, Where Do Mixed Babies Belong? Racial Clas-
sification in America and its Implications for Transracial Adoption, 29 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 531, 551 (1994) (discussing that the National Association for
Black Social Workers termed interracial adoption as "cultural genocide").
95. Genocide Convention, supra note 20, art. 2; Rome Treaty, supra note 7, art.
6.
96. See RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 83, at 37 (distinguishing different in-
terpretations of the number requirement in the definition of genocide). Some
scholars argue that "part" should be interpreted as "substantial," while others argue
that it should be interpreted as "proportional." See id. The consensus, however, is
that the amount must be "substantial." See id.
97. See id.
98. See 1998 Hearing, supra note 1 (statement by Lee A. Casey & David B.
Rivkin, Jr.) (discussing the broad definitions of crimes and the potential for inter-
pretation problems).
99. See Rome Treaty, supra note 7, art. 6 (setting forth a requirement of geno-
cide as the "intent to destroy"); see also Genocide Convention, supra note 20, art.
II (declaring an intent to destroy necessary for the crime of genocide); Lippman,
supra note 89, at 477 (noting that genocidal intent can be inferred from the facts).
Some commentators argue that American conduct in Vietnam in the 1960s and
1970s amounted to genocide. See RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 83, at 42 (inti-
mating that the United States may have intended to destroy part of the nation of
Vietnam through the bombing attacks on the countryside during the conflict); see
also Lippman, supra note 89, at 476-78 (noting that Jean-Paul Sartre said that the
United States' imperialist actions in Vietnam constituted genocide by the very na-
ture of the imperialism).
100. See RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 82, at 33 (commenting that intent has
to be imputed to the individual).
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tions can infer "intent."' ' Thus, it is problematic for an entire claim
to be based upon circumstantial evidence." ,0,
2. Crimes Against Humanity"
The Rome Treaty lists eleven crimes as "crimes against humanity"
when they are committed "as part of a widespread or systematic at-
tack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the
attack. ' 0° These crimes include: murder;'"' extermination;'" en-
slavement;' deportation or forcible transfer of population;" impris-
101. See id. at 34 (citing a United Nations Genocide Study that says that where
documentary evidence is lacking, one can infer intent from actions or omissions).
102. See id. at 35 (using the Tribunal for Rwanda as an example of imputing in-
tent by actions). To infer genocidal intent, the Tribunal looked at dispersed propa-
ganda leaflets, the number of Tutsis killed, and the common practice of separating
the ethnic groups at road blocks. See id.
103. See id. at 45-46 (summarizing the history of crimes against humanity
building up to the Rome Treaty). After World War I, the notion of imputing indi-
vidual criminal responsibility for crimes against humanity surfaced. See il. (noting
that even though there was a committee established to investigate the Turkish Mas-
sacre of the Armenians, the committee did not take any action, concluding the in-
cident was more a matter of morality than international law). The Nuremberg
Charter, following World War II, was the turning point in the history of the prose-
cution of crimes against humanity. See SUNGA, supra note 30, at 161. From that
point forward, the interpretation of crimes against humanity became less stringent
because the international community removed the previous requirement of the ex-
istence of an international armed conflict. See id. In addition, the international
community expanded its definition of "crimes against humanity" through the in-
clusion of the phrase in multilateral human rights conventions. See id. (showing the
positive effect that the Genocide Convention and Apartheid Convention had on
expanding the "crimes against humanity" norm to apply in both times of war and
peace).
104. Rome Treaty, supra note 7, art. 7.
105. See id. art. 7(l)(a).
106. See id. art. 7(2)(b) (including the deprivation of access to food and medi-
cine, calculated to bring about the destruction of part of the population).
107. See id. art. 7(2)(c) (defining "enslavement" as "the exercise of any or all
the powers attaching to the right of ownership over a person and includes the exer-
cise of such power in the course of trafficking in persons, in particular women and
children").
108. See id. art. 7(2)(d) (explaining forcible transfer as "forced displacement of
the persons concerned by expulsion or other coercive acts from the area in which
they are lawfully present, without grounds permitted under international law").
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onment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of
fundamental rules of international law;'09 torture;"0 rape, sexual slav-
ery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization,
or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity;"' perse-
cution" 2 against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, ra-
cial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender or other grounds that
are universally recognized as impermissible under international
law;" 3 enforced disappearance of persons; ' 4 apartheid;" and other
inhumane acts of similar character intentionally causing great suf-
fering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health." 
6
109. See Rome Treaty, supra note 7, art. 7(1 )(e).
110. See id. art. 7(2)(e) (setting forth "torture" as "the intentional infliction of
severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, upon a person in the custody
or under the control of the accused; except that torture shall not include pain or
suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions"). The Ar-
ticle 3 that is common to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions prohibits parties from
committing at any time or in any place acts of "violence to life and person, ...
mutilation, cruel treatment, and torture" or "outrages against human dignity, in
particular humiliating and degrading treatment." See SUNGA, supra note 29, at
129-30 (discussing that the common Article 3 establishes standard of treatment and
applies both in times of international and non-international armed conflict).
111. See Rome Treaty, supra note 7, art. 7(2) (limiting the definition to the con-
finement of a woman forcibly impregnated with the "intent of affecting the ethnic
composition of any population or carrying out other grave violations of interna-
tional law").
112. See id. art. 7(2)(g) (defining "persecution" as the "intentional and severe
deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of the
identity of the group or collectivity").
113. See SUNGA, supra note 29, at 148 (discussing how the Rome Treaty spe-
cifically omits identifying persecution based on social grounds). The Rome Treaty
is broader than Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter, which covers only persecu-
tion based on political, racial, and religious grounds). See id.
114. See Rome Treaty, supra note 7, art. 7(2)(i) (defining "enforced disappear-
ance" as "the arrest, detention or abduction of persons by, or with the authoriza-
tion, support or acquiescence of, a State or political organization, followed by a
refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the
fate or whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing them from the
protection of the law for a prolonged period of time"); see also RATNER &
ABRAMS, supra note 83, at 74 (stating that the Organization of American States
created this category as a new international norm).
115. See Rome Treaty, supra note 7, art. 7(j).
116. See id. art. 7(k).
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Unfortunately, the Rome Treaty does not define these crimes in
such a way as to avoid potential interpretation problems."' For ex-
ample, the definition of murder varies from country to country."' For
deterrence-a major goal of the ICC-to be effective, the potential
violator must have a firm understanding of the law."' In the United
States, a statute must warn the individual of the criminality of her
actions.2 0 Furthermore, under American jurisprudence, statutes that
fail to give notice are unconstitutional deprivations of due process.121
Many of the crimes included in the Rome Treaty are not settled mat-
ters in international law, leaving those subject to the jurisdiction
without full knowledge of what is an actionable offense."' Thus, the
provision outlining crimes against humanity is too vague to give
adequate notice.'In
117. See SUNGA, supra note 29, at 149 (emphasizing that many words have am-
biguous meanings). For example, the word "persecution" is elastic. See il A broad
reading of the term could make the unequal distribution of public financial assis-
tance persecution based on social or cultural grounds. See id. at 148. A narrow
reading may only cover serious acts such as murder, torture, or apartheid. See id. at
149. There is no uniform definition of persecution in international criminal law.
See id. In addition, there is the possibility of crimes overlapping. See Theodor
Meron, International Crininalization of Internal -Atrocities, 89 AM. J. INT'L L.
554, 588 (1995) (describing that genocide fits into the crimes against humanity
category).
118. See SUNGA, supra note 29, at 127 (discussing the absence of international
norms for individual responsibility for mass murder). Israel, for example, equates
starvation with deliberate killing. See id. at 68.
119. See Christopher Keith Hall, Current Development: The Third an Fourth
Sessions of the UN Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an Interna-
tional Criminal Court, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 124, 126-27 (1998) (outlining the diffi-
culties in defining crimes against humanity). The definition of crimes against hu-
manity has evolved considerably since the Nuremberg Charter. See id. In the
process of defining crimes against humanity, different views emerged regarding
the scale and gravity of the crimes. See id. Most of the states agreed, nevertheless,
that the definition would be too restrictive if the crimes were required to be both
widespread and systematic. See id. Therefore, there is tremendous leeway in the
interpretation of the Rome Treaty.
120. See Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223,230 (1951).
121. See Dempsey, supra note 19 (discussing the unconstitutionality of the pro-
visions within the ICC).
122. See id. (explaining the lack of generally-accepted treaties on some of the
crimes against humanity).
123. See id. (explaining why the Rome Treaty is unconstitutional).
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3. War Crimes
Article 8 of the Rome Treaty gives the ICC jurisdiction over war
crimes'24 when "committed as a part of a plan or policy or as part of a
large-scale commission of such crimes.""'2 A substantial difference
between war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, is that
war crimes can be committed on a smaller scale.'26 Even if there is no
pattern of such crimes, the ICC could classify as a war crime the
murder of a civilian or a single rape committed in connection with an
internal or international armed conflict or military occupation of a
country. 11 With approximately 200,000 United States military per-
sonnel permanently stationed in forty countries around the world,
there are potentially significant consequences to the United States
because of this expansive definition of war crimes.' 2' This large
124. See RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 83, at 79 (discussing the evolution of
war crimes). The concept of war crimes appeared as early as 1899 and 1907 in the
Law of the Hague, which established guidelines for weaponry in war. See id. Fol-
lowing suit, the Law of Geneva established guidelines for the treatment of non-
combatants during war. See id. The face of war has now become more internal than
international, and, as a result, its new nature poses many problems for the estab-
lishment of international norms guiding wartime procedures. See id.; see also su-
pra notes 18-20 and accompanying text (discussing the evolution of modern war-
fare).
125. Rome Treaty, supra note 7, art. 8. Specifically, war crimes include: (I)
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949; (2) other serious violations of
the laws and customs of international law applicable in international conflict; (3) in
the case of an internal armed conflict, serious violations of Article 3 common to
the four 1949 Geneva Conventions committed against noncombatants; and (4)
other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in internal armed con-
flicts. See id.
126. See Aryeh Neier, An International Court That America Could Back, INT'L
HERALD TRIB., June 30, 1998, at 8.
127. See id. (discussing that Canada prosecuted soldiers for war crimes in So-
malia, even though their crimes were not pursuant to a government policy). But see
1998 Hearings, supra note I (statement of Michael P. Scharf, Director, the Center
for International Law and Policy, New England School of Law) (arguing that, for
example, the ICC would not have jurisdiction over an incident such as the acci-
dental downing of an Iranian Airbus by the U.S.S. Vincennes because the incident
did not represent a "policy" - it was a random act).
128. See Craig Turner, Battle for World Court Heats Up; More than 100 Na-
tions Try to Hammer Out Pact on a Permanent War Crimes Tribunal, U.S. is As-
sailed for Seeking Restrictions, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1998, at A9 (noting that since
the United States has such a large military presence overseas, it has the largest
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commitment means that there is a greater likelihood that the ICC
could bring United States soldiers before it for allegations of war
crines. 129 For example, if the international community created the
Rome Treaty before the Vietnam War, it is possible that the ICC
could have indicted United States citizens for war crimes. '
Since the Vietnam War, there have been other claims that the
United States violated humanitarian law. One claim asserts that dur-
stake of all the nations involved in the negotiations, and consequently seeks to
limit the ICC's authority).
129. See id. (reporting the fear that the court could be used against the omni-
present American troops is the force behind the American quest for a narrowly-
defined court).
130. See Taylor Says by Yanashita Ruling Westinoreland May be Guilty, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 9, 1971, at A3 (noting that former Nuremberg Chief Prosecutor Tel-
ford Taylor stated that General William C. Westmoreland, a former commander of
the United States forces in Vietnam, might be convicted as a war criminal if he
were held to the same standard established at the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials).
Many people argue that the United States committed war crimes in Vietnam. See
id. For example, Seymour M. Hersh, an investigative reporter, described the
United States actions following the Tet offensive as a "systematic campaign of
mass killings aimed at the rural population." See SEYMOUR M. HERSH, What Hap-
pened in My Lai? in VIETNAM AND AMERICA 410 (Marvin E. Gettleman, et al.
eds., 2d ed. 1995) (revealing that the United States had a threefold plan after the
Tet offensive: (1) massive assaults from the air, (2) systematic destruction of vil-
lages by ground troops; and (3) the CIA-coordinated Phoenix Program of mass ar-
rests, torture, and assassination). The 1969 My Lai Massacre, an incident where
American soldiers raped, tortured, and executed civilians, was a glaring example of
violations of humanitarian law. See Private Meadlo Explains the 1968 Mv Lai
Massacre, in MAJOR PROBLEMS IN AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS SINCE 1914,
VOL. II, 551-54 (Thomas G. Patterson & Dennis Merrill eds., 4th ed. 1995) (giving
details to a New York Times reporter on what transpired at My Lai); see also
MARILYN B. YOUNG, THE VIETNAM WARS 1945-1990 243 (1991) (stating that the
Army systematically covered up the incidents at My Lai and that the attack on ci-
vilians was not unique). Furthermore, United States forces destroyed entire prov-
inces when they believed that the inhabitants supported the National Liberation
Front. See HERSH, supra note 130, at 411-12 (relating an investigation of the "war
crimes" committed during the Vietnam Conflict, which included individual and
group acts of murder, rape, sodomy, maiming, and assault on noncombatants). By
late 1967, seventy percent of the villages in Quang Ngai province had been de-
stroyed by the American offensive. See id. at 411; see also YOUNG. supra note
130, at 259-60 (arguing that if the laws of war were applied to American conduct
in Vietnam, the leaders of the United States may be guilty of war crimes). Of the
six servicemen prosecuted for the My Lai incident, five were acquitted by a mili-
tary court. See LILLICH & HANNUM, supra note 67, at 861. Lieutenant Calley, the
only person who was not acquitted, was found guilty of murder in April 1971. See
United States v. Calley, 46 C.M.R. 1131 (1973).
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ing the Persian Gulf War, the coalition forces targeted Iraq's eco-
nomic infrastructure-communication, transportation systems, and
water-pumping plants-and thereby targeted the civilian popula-
tion.' A more recent example is the allegations put forth by Sudan
that the United States' use of force in the missile strike against a
factory was disproportionate to its goal.' If Sudan had ratified the
Rome Treaty and the ICC did not believe the United States properly




The Rome Conference delegates did not decide on a definition of
aggression at the time that they drafted the Rome Treaty.3 4 This pre-
sents several problems. First, the crime of aggression is difficult to
define.'13 Similar to the vagueness in the definition of crimes against
humanity, the crime of aggression should have a clear definition in
order to have a deterrent effect.'36 Second, if the international com-
131. See Michael Walzer, Justice and Injustice in the Gulf War, in BUT WAS IT
JUST? REFLECTIONS ON MORALITY IN THE PERSIAN GULF WAR 13 (David E. De-
cosse ed., 1992) (questioning the attack on the civilian society); see also LILLICH &
HANNUM, supra note 67, at 879 (discussing how the Iraqis accused the United
States of targeting civilian installations, including a "munitions" factory that pur-
portedly produced milk powder and a shelter serving as a civilian morgue). See
also William Schultz, Remarks at News Conference held by Amnesty International
(June 17, 1998), available in 1998 WL 318000 (discussing the United States'
"untold human rights violations" such as the growing use of special operations
forces overseas and training offered to Indonesian and Colombian military units).
132. See International Criminal Tribunal (National Public Radio "Talk of the
Nation" radio broadcast, Sept. 8, 1998), available in LEXIS, News Library, Tran-
scripts file (discussing the possibility of the ICC indicting Americans).
133. See id. (mentioning that in a potential ICC investigation, a further problem
would be that the United States would have to produce its military intelligence re-
ports to prove that the attack was warranted).
134. See Podgers, supra note 16 (stating that the most substantive task ahead is
to develop a narrow definition of aggression).
135. See Dr. William C. Gilmore, Symposium: International Criminal Law: The
Proposed hIternational Criminal Court: Recent Developments, TRANSNAT'L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBs. 263, 272 (1995) (discussing the difficulty of defining aggression
and the necessity of its inclusion in an international criminal law tribunal).
136. See Dempsey, supra note 20 (describing the "void for vagueness" doc-
trine). The Supreme Court ruled that criminal statutes need to give due notice in
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munity decides to use the 1991 ILC Draft Code on Crimes Against
the Peace and Security of Mankind ("Draft Code Provisions on Ag-
gression")'37 as a model for the definition of aggression, the national
security objectives of individual states will be affected drastically.""
Article 15 of the Draft Code Provision on Aggression defines aggres-
sion as "the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty,
territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in
any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Na-
tions.'"3 9 It further provides accountability for "an individual who as
a leader or organizer plans, commits or orders the commission of an
act.""* Therefore, since aggression is a national policy involving the
top policy makers, the inclusion of this crime in the ICC will pose a
direct threat to the country's leaders."' This is in comparison to other
crimes, such as crimes against humanity, that can be committed by
those in all levels of the chain of command. '2
Furthermore, in Article 16 of the Draft Code Provision on Aggres-
sion, "threats of aggression" are also loosely defined.'' Under Article
16, a prosecutor must prove the threat of aggression by showing the
following elements: (1) the perpetrator had the requisite intent to
make the threat; (2) the act in question was such that it constituted a
threat to the government and the government was reasonable in per-
order to act as a deterrent. See id.
137. See 1991 ILC Draft Code on Crimes Against the Peace and Security of
Mankind, arts. 15-16, in SUNGA, supra note 29, at 346-48.
138. See 1998 Hearing, supra note 1 (statement of David J. Scheffer, Ambassa-
dor-at-Large for War Crimes Issues) (arguing that aggression is not part of cus-
tomary international lav for the purposes of criminal responsibility).
139. SUNGA, supra note 29, at 346.
140. Id.
141. See SUNGA, supra note 29, at 31-32 (discussing how aggression, interven-
tion, and colonial domination are crimes involving government leaders, whereas
war crimes can involve anyone-from a commander to an individual soldier).
142. See id.
143. See 1991 ILC Draft Code On Crimes Against the Peace and Security of
Mankind, art. 16, in SNGA, supra note 29, at 348 (providing that the threat of ag-
gression consists of declarations, communications, demonstrations of force, or any
other measures "which would give good reason to the Government of a State to
believe that aggression is being seriously contemplated against that State"); see
also SUNGA, supra note 29, at 61-62 (discussing the difficulty in enforcing the
draft code).
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ceiving it as a threat; and (3) the state against which the threat was
directed actually felt threatened by the act.' It will be difficult to
meet this burden of proof. 45 Thus, under this interpretation, aggres-
sion would be a tough legal concept to apply in practice.'46
There is also a gray area in the interpretation of this test. The in-
ternational community could now perceive actions as aggression that
they did not deem so in the past. 47 For example, states recognize a
right to test armaments, to the extent that an international treaty does
not prohibit the testing or that the testing does not directly affect an-
other state.'4 8 If the international community adopts the Draft Code
Provisions on Aggression's definition, however, one state may use
this provision to lodge a claim against another state, alleging that an
aggressive war is being contemplated against them.' 49 Not only
would this lower the credibility of the ICC in the international arena,
but it also would lead to a scenario where the international commu-
nity would not take the crime of aggression seriously.5 "
144. See SUNGA, supra note 29, at 60 (discussing the need for certainty in de-
fining crimes); see 1998 Hearing, supra note I (statement of Sen. Jesse Helms)
(noting that the Rome Conference delegates could not reach an agreement on the
definition). Before the Senate subcommittee, Sen. Helms declared:
I think I can anticipate what will constitute a crime of "aggression" in the eyes of this
Court: it will be a crime of aggression when the United States of America takes any
military action to defend its national interests, unless the U.S. first seeks and receives
the permission of the United Nations.
Id. (imagining a parade of horrible scenarios, specifically if the court were judging
the United States' invasions of Panama and Grenada).
145. See SUNGA, supra note 29, at 62-63 (explaining that an inconsistent ruling
could trivialize the ICC).
146. See id. at 62 (describing the elasticity in the definition of aggression, which
poses problems with enforcement).
147. See United States Department of Defense, News Briefing, M2 Presswire,
Apr. 16, 1998 (disclosing the Defense Department's fear that the ICC would be
established in a way that would give it broad authority to pursue a vague definition
of aggression, and thus creating for confusion between aggression and legitimate
defensive action to protect security interests).
148. See SUNGA, supra note 29, at 60 (describing how a State may claim that
their sovereignty was in jeopardy as a result of another State's ostentatious display
of military armaments).
149. See id.
150. See id. at 62-63 (warning about the possibility of incongruous rulings from
the Security Council and a permanent court could trivialize the court and criminal
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Intervention.. is another policy that may fall under the rubric of
aggression.52 When a foreign country invites another government to
aid in its defense, a problem in interpretation may arise.' The ICC
may charge leaders of the invited nation with aggression, reasoning
that the invited nation is infringing upon another nation's sover-
eignty.'" In the twentieth century, the United States has been in-
volved in Cuba, Grenada, Nicaragua, and other strictly internal con-
flicts.'55 If the international community adopts the Draft Code
Provisions on Aggression's definition, with intervention contained
therein, the foreign policy of the United States would fall into a pre-
culpability of individuals before the court).
151. See 1991 ILC Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of
Mankind, art. 16, in SUNGA, supra note 29, at 348. It provides that:
An individual who as leader or organizer commits or orders the commission of an act
of intervention in internal or external affairs of a State shall, on conviction thereof, be
sentenced [to.. ].
Intervention in the internal or external affairs of a State consists of fomenting [armed]
subversive or terrorist activities or by organizing, assisting or financing such activities,
or supplying arms for the purpose of such activities, thereby [seriously] undermining
the free exercise by that State of its sovereign rights.
Nothing in this article shall in any way prejudice the ight of peoples to self-
determination as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.
Id.
152. See UN CHARTER art. 2(7) (establishing that nothing in the charter author-
izes the United Nations to intervene in a nation's domestic matters). See SUNGA,
supra note 29, at 67-68 (mentioning how the United Nations rejected arguments to
limit United Nations' actions based on art. 2(7)).
153. See SUNGA, supra note 29, at 73 (describing the complications involved
with the concept of intervention). See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar.
v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 4 (June 27) (holding that where collective self-defense is in-
voked, it is to be expected that the state for whose benefit this right is used should
have declared itself to be the victim of an armed attack).
154. See SUNGA, supra note 29, at 74 (discussing whether an invitation is valid
depends on the recognition of the legitimacy of the government by the interna-
tional community).
155. See John Norton Moore, The Secret War in Central America and the Fit-
ture of World Order, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 43, 44-48 (1986) (questioning the United
States' involvement in Nicaragua); Jules Lobel, Covert War and Congressional
Authority: Hidden War and Forgotten Power, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1035, 1050
(1986) (discussing that the Central Intelligence Agency backed covert military op-
erations in Nicaragua and Guatemala); Francis A. Boyle et al.. International Law-
lessness in Grenada, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 172, 172 (1984) (refuting the Reagan Ad-
ministration's justification for intervention in Grenada).
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carious position.5 6 The United States government would then have to
determine how its actions would be perceived in the international
community before it could aid any of its allies.
5. Expanded Jurisdiction
The Rome Treaty and the creation of the ICC mark the stepping
off point for international criminal prosecution. "' More crimes can
be placed under the umbrella of the ICC's jurisdiction since Article
121 of the Rome Treaty allows for amendments to the categories of
crime under the jurisdiction of the court.'58 In the final days of the
Rome Conference, the delegates added a Final Act, "9 expressing the
community's desire to include international drug trafficking'6 and
international terrorism'6 ' to the crimes under the jurisdiction of the
court at a later date. The difficulty with the addition of these and
other crimes is that they would infringe upon a nation's sovereignty
156. See SUNGA, supra note 29, at 103 (discussing how the international com-
munity also is contemplating including colonial domination under the crime of ag-
gression). This also presents a dangerous position for United States' foreign policy.
See Edgardo Rodriguez Julia, A Look at Puerto Rico: Escaping a Colonial State of
Mind, WASH. POST, July 26, 1998, at C3 (discussing how many critics argue that
the United States relationship with Puerto Rico amounts to nothing less than colo-
nial domination); see also 1991 ILC Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and
Security of Mankind, art. 18, in SUNGA, supra note 29, at 348 (identifying a leader
as the guilty party if he establishes or maintains by force colonial domination or
any other alien domination contrary to the United Nations Charter).
157. See Dempsey, supra note 19 (stating that the Rome Treaty is just the be-
ginning of a greater supranational jurisdiction); see also Kofi Annan, New Interna-
tional Court Fulfills a U.N. Dream that Began in 1948, BOSTON GLOBE, July 31,
1998, at A 19 (remarking that many proponents of the ICC would like the court to
have even farther reaching powers).
158. See Rome Treaty, supra note 7, art. 121 ("After the expiry of seven years
from the entry into force of this Statute, any State Party may propose amendments
thereto.").
159. See Final Act of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipoten-
tiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998 (vis-
ited Sept. 9, 1998) <http:// www.un.org/icc/a/conf.183/10 (resolution E)> (recom-
mending the inclusion of drug trafficking and terrorism in the ICC's jurisdiction).
160. See MacPherson, supra note 17, at 23 (describing the push by smaller states
for the inclusion of drug trafficking out of the fear of corruption inhibiting domes-
tic procedure).
161. See id. at 44 (arguing that the court will not have the technology and re-
sources required to investigate acts of terrorism).
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and ability to try crimes that affect domestic policy in their home
setting.'62 The potential for jurisdictional expansion of the Rome
Treaty is virtually limitless.' 63 Expanding the ICC's jurisdiction even
further diminishes the possibility of the ICC being effective in any
area because states could shift their responsibilities to adjudicate
crimes to the ICC.' 64
C. POLITICIZATION OF THE COURT
The United States has a valid fear that the ICC will not be free
from politicization. 6' From the outset, the ICC has been already po-
litically motivated. 6" There are several ways in which political con-
162. See 1998 Hearing, supra note 1 (statement of David J. Scheffer, Ambassa-
dor-at-Large for War Crimes Issues) (stating that the United States opposes the ad-
dition of terrorism and drug crimes to the jurisdiction of the court "on the grounds
that this could undermine more effective national efforts"); see also Wexler, supra
note 15, at 724 (discussing the addition of these crimes as complicating the Rome
Treaty and undermining the prosecution of international humanitarian law and
crimes against humanity).
163. See Dempsey, supra note 19 (describing the potential for the ICC to be-
come a "jurisdictional leviathan").
164. See MacPherson, supra note 17, at 44 (commentating that if the court were
not limited to serious offenses, states would shirk their responsibilities by dumping
insignificant matters on the court).
165. See S. REP. No. 103-71, at 23-24 (1993) (statement by Edwin D. William-
son) (commenting that in other forums, the United States has been unsuccessful in
creating non-politicized agencies). The fact that Cuba, Iran, and Libya all sit on the
United Nations Human Rights Commission demonstrates this concept. See it.: see
also Fred Hiatt, The Trouble With the War Crimes Court, WASH. POST, July 26,
1998, at C7 (criticizing the United States for not being forthright enough in oppo-
sition to the ICC); S. REP. No. 103-71, at 27 (1993) (Letter by United States De-
partment of State) (stating the concern that the ICC will develop into a politicized
body). Since the judgment of an international criminal court could preclude a state
from subsequently prosecuting or extraditing a suspected criminal for the same or a
closely related offense, the ICC could inhibit a country from bringing new charges
based on the same facts. See id.
166. See Nathan, supra note 15 (discussing Israel's position that the Rome
Treaty is politicized). Many people assert that the inclusion of "population trans-
fers" as a war crime directly targets the state of Israel. See Editorial: The World
Court: Symbolism vs. Reality, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1998, at B2 (observing that
this idea came courtesy of Egypt, who reaped much admiration among the Arab
states); see also Hiatt, supra note 165, at C7 (questioning the potential for an unbi-
ased and impartial court based on the seemingly pointed attack on Israel). Since
critics have accused Israel of encouraging Israeli Jews to settle in the occupied ter-
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siderations can hamper the elements of justice that the ICC seeks to
create.
First, according to Article 13 of the Rome Treaty, the ICC can ex-
ercise jurisdiction in three instances: if a state party refers a claim to
the prosecutor; if the Security Council refers a claim to the prosecu-
tor; or if the prosecutor herself initiates the investigation."' The
prosecutor has the power to determine whom to indict and when. '6 It
is conceivable that political considerations could be a motivating
ritories, this clause appears to be pointed at Israel. See Ross Dunn, Netanyahu 'at
Risk of Arrest by New Court', THE TIMES, July 21, 1998, at 12 (quoting the legal
advisor to the Israeli government as saying that the Israeli policy of settling the oc-
cupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip places the Prime Minister and
the cabinet at risk of arrest by the ICC when traveling abroad).
167. See Rome Treaty, supra note 7, art. 13(a)-(c); see also id. arts. 14, 15, 16
(describing the procedure to exercise jurisdiction).
168. See id. art. 15 (describing the role of the prosecutor). The Treaty sets forth
the prosecutor's powers and duties as follows:
1. The Prosecutor may initiate investigations proprio motu on the basis of information
on crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.
2. The Prosecutor shall analyze the seriousness of the information received. For this
purpose, he or she may seek additional information from States, organs of the United
Nations, intergovernmental or non-governmental organizations, or other reliable
sources that he or she deems appropriate, and may receive written or oral testimony at
the seat of the Court.
3. If the Prosecutor concludes that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an inves-
tigation, he or she shall submit to the Pre-Trial Chamber a request for authorization of
an investigation, together with any supporting material collected. Victims may make
representations to the Pre-Trial Chamber, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure
and Evidence.
4. If the Pre-Trial Chamber, upon examination of the request and the supporting mate-
rial, considers that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation, and the
case appears to fall within the jurisdiction of the Court, it shall authorize the com-
mencement of the investigation, without prejudice to subsequent determinations by the
Court with regard to the jurisdiction and admissibility of a case.
5. The refusal of the Pre-Trial Chamber to authorize the investigation shall not pre-
clude the presentation of a subsequent request by the Prosecutor based on new facts or
evidence regarding the same situation.
6. If, after the preliminary examination referred to in paragraphs I and 2, the Prosecu-
tor concludes that the information provided does not constitute a reasonable basis for
an investigation, he or she shall inform those who provided the information. This shall
not preclude the Prosecutor from considering further information submitted to him or
her regarding the same situation in light of new facts or evidence.
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factor in the decision.'69 Exacerbating matters further is the fact that
there is no body of law to which the ICC will be responsible to, nor
any judicial organization to hear the appeals of ICC decisions.'
Second, despite United States objections,'7 ' the Rome Treaty only
requires the ratification by a state where the crime was committed,
the state of the nationality of the perpetrator, or for the state to have
granted consent, in order for the ICC to have jurisdiction of the ac-
cused.'72 This definition is problematic not only because it potentially
gives the court jurisdiction over citizens of nonsignatory states, but
also because its exercise of jurisdiction may not be consistent. '"
Since internal conflicts are so prevalent, and if the country embroiled
in an internal conflict did not ratify the Rome Treaty, the persecutors
will be beyond the reach of the court.'
7 1
The third potentially worrisome area is the determination of who
fits within the definition of "criminal."' One would hope that the
court will not be swayed by political interests and only prosecute
those persons actually responsible for the crimes under its jurisdic-
169. See SUNGA, supra note 29, at 61 (discussing how high profile cases in-
volving criminal responsibility of a top leader may intensify pressure on the prose-
cutor to select that individual for indictment); see also Gerry J. Simpson. War
Crimes: A Critical Introduction, in THE LAW OF WAR CRIMES, NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES 8 (Timothy L.H. McCormack & Gerry J. Simpson
eds., 1997) (indicating there is a partiality of decision making). For example, there
is a tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda but not for Guatemala or So-
malia. See id.
170. See Dempsey, supra note 19 (agreeing with the Defense Department's con-
cem that the ICC lacks the appropriate checks and balances).
171. See 1998 Hearing, supra note I (statement of David J. Scheffer, Ambassa-
dor-at-Large for War Crimes Issues) (explaining the United States' objections to
the jurisdiction of the court).
172. See Rome Treat,, supra note 7, art. 12.
173. See 1998 Hearing, supra note 1 (statement of David J. Scheffer, Ambassa-
dor-at-Large for War Crimes Issues) (clarifying the point that the jurisdictional
reach of the court exposes multinational peacekeepers, but not those responsible
for internal conflicts).
174. See Scheffer, supra note 16 (criticizing the Rome Treaty's potential ineq-
uities in justice).
175. See 1998 Hearing, supra note 1 (statement by Lee A. Casey & David B.
Rivkin, Jr.) (arguing that the person most likely to be indicted would be the Presi-
dent, due to his capacity of commander-in-chief).
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tion."' The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugosla-
via ("ICTY"), an ad hoc tribunal, demonstrates the possibility of po-
litically-motivated indictments or the lack thereof.17 The ICTY has
yet to hold Slobodan Milosevic, the Serbian leader responsible for
much of the violence in the former Yugoslavia, accountable for his
war crimes and crimes against humanity.
78
On the other hand, political motivations may tempt the ICC to in-
dict high level officials since those leaders are often responsible for
planning or ignoring the perpetration of crimes."' Article 27 of the
Rome Treaty provides a basis for such charges, stating that the stat-
ute shall apply to all persons regardless of one's official capacity. 80
This will pose a direct threat to the leaders of many nations.'8' Thus,
these leaders could be motivated by fear of prosecution by the ICC,
and as a result, may not always act in the best interest of their coun-
176. See Robinson, supra note 8, at 10 (concluding that by obtaining the best
jurists to sit on the court, the ICC will uphold the highest standards of international
law).
177. See James R. Hooper, U.N. Prosecutor Must Go To Kosovo, TORONTO
STAR, Sept. 16, 1998, at 1 (discussing that it is troubling that the United Nations
War Crimes Tribunal Chief Prosecutor is keeping a low profile regarding Kosovo
while she has the power to prevent ethnic cleansing).
178. See id. (suggesting that the prosecutor should state publicly that Milosevic
will be held accountable for his crimes).
179. See Dempsey, supra note 19 (discussing concerns raised with bringing top
political and military leaders to trial). If the court tries political and military lead-
ers, it will undermine efforts to resolve international conflicts. See id. For example,
if the ICC indicts a wartime leader, he may become angry with the ICC and decide
to cancel negotiations for peace. See id.
180. See Rome Treaty, supra note 7, art. 27(1) (stating that "official capacity as a
Head of State or Government, a member of a Government or parliament, an
elected representative a government official shall in no case exempt a person from
criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a
ground for reduction of sentence").
181. See S. REP. No. 103-71, at 24 (1993) (statement of Edwin D. Williamson)
(testifying that he remembered hearing about "reports of a proposal to establish a
tribunal in Tunis in late 1990 to try President Bush for war crimes in the Gulf");
see also, Hiatt, supra note 165, at C7 (remarking that if the ICC would render a
decision on transgressions during the system of apartheid in South Africa, former
President DeKlerk himself could be held responsible).
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try-12 Moreover, a country's best interest may not be the same as the
ICC's perception of how a country should act.
Fourth, the United States is skeptical of the ICC's intended impar-
tiality."3 At the Rome Conference, the United States sought to in-
clude protections against potentially biased actions, allowing the
United Nations Security Council the power to initiate investiga-
tions.1 8 In addition to advocating for a strong role for the Security
Council, the United States delegation argued for a ten-year transi-
tional period where a party could "opt out" of the jurisdiction of the
court for crimes against humanity and war crimes.'" Delegates at the
Rome Conference, however, rejected both the "opt out" provision for
crimes against humanity and a prosecutorial role for the Security
Council.
8 6
Finally, the cost of an international criminal court could be enor-
mous." 7 The ICC's funds will derive partially from voluntary contri-
butions by governments, international organizations, individuals, and
corporations.' Voluntary contributions, however, could lead to a
182. See Hiatt, supra note 165, at C7 (observing the broad power of prosecutors
to initiate investigations whenever they choose).
183. See 1998 Hearing, supra note I (statement of Michael P. Scharf, Director,
Center for International Law and Policy, New England School of Law) (noting that
the United States is in a particularly "vulnerable" position because of its many
peacekeeping and humanitarian missions).
184. See 1998 Hearing, supra note 1 (statement of David J. Scheffer, Ambassa-
dor-at-Large for War Crimes Issues) (urging for a more powerful role for the Secu-
rity Council).
185. See id. (statement of David J. Scheffer, Ambassador-at-Large for War
Crimes Issues) (discussing the need for evaluation of the performance of the court
within the international community). The delegation believed that this review
would give the United States an appropriate amount of time to determine whether
the court would function as an unbiased court administering international justice or
if it would be used as a politicized tool. See id.
186. See id. (criticizing the opt-out provision for war crimes but not for crimes
against humanity).
187. See Adrian Karatnycky, Don't Worr3y War Criminals-News' Court Won 't
Work, WALL ST. J., July 27, 1998, at A15 (suggesting that since the Rome Confer-
ence itself was expensive, the cost of the ICC will be immense).
188. See Rome Treaty, supra note 7, art. 116 (determining voluntary contribu-
tions).
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more politicized court.' 89 If there is a country or bloc of countries that
donates a significant amount of money, those countries may be likely
to influence the prosecutor to exercise his or her discretion in their
favor.'° For example, if the European Union donated a large percent-
age of the ICC's budget, it is plausible that the prosecutor, fearing
that the European Union would not contribute as much the following
year, would be more sensitive to its claims. 19'
All of these factors illustrate the possibility of a court that over-
looks its primary goal of justice and becomes driven by political mo-
tivations. Since it is possible for these fears to turn into reality, the
United States has no way to protect itself from becoming the victim
of the international community's political motivations.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
Criminal law has traditionally existed in the realm of national gov-
ernments.192 The ICC seeks to expand criminal law to a supranational
level.' 93 The problem with this expansion, however, is that individual
states must acquiesce, and forfeit part of their sovereignty in order to
189. See MacPherson, supra note 17, at 48 (discussing that it would be reason-
able to have the complainant pay because then it would remove the economic in-
centive to dump cases on the court).
190. See Dempsey, supra note 19 (describing the mismanagement of the
Rwanda Tribunal). Since large tribunals have fallen prey to mismanagement of
funds in the past, the same may happen to the ICC. See id. (listing the financial
abuses of the Rwanda Tribunal).
191. See id. (noting some potential problems with voluntary contributions). If
the ICC is funded by mandatory contributions, twenty-five percent of the court's
cost may be passed on the United States. See id.
192. See 1998 Hearing, supra note 1 (statement of Sen. John Ashcroft) ("if there
is one component of sovereignty, it is the authority to define crimes and punish-
ment"); see also David Stoelting, International Courts Flourish in 1990s, N.Y.
L.J., Aug. 4, 1997, at S2 (discussing how the right to apply punitive sanctions is
"inextricably linked with sovereignty").
193. See Sandra L. Jamison, A Permanent International Criminal Court: A Pro-
posal that Overcomes Past Objections, 23 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 419, 447
(advocating the expansion of international criminal law through the research, dis-
cussion and writings of judges on an international criminal tribunal); see also
Wexler, supra note 15, at 717-18 (elaborating on the growth of international crimi-
nal law leading up to the formation of ICC).
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adjudicate matters of criminal law in this manner.'" Often, the inter-
ests of domestic governments may not coincide with the interests of
the international community.' 95 Proponents of the ICC argue that the
ICC is supposed to complement national criminal justice systems in-
stead of replacing them.' 96 Yet, Article 17 of the Rome Treaty gives
the ICC the ability to step in and carry out an investigation "if a state
is unwilling or unable to."' 9' Many advocates of supranational or-
ganizations believe that the ICC is "an essential building block in the
slowly-growing edifice of international law."''" In its current form,
however, this court is too powerful and would have too much control
over the inner workings of the domestic and foreign policies of sov-
ereign states.'99
The international community needs to alter the Rome Treaty sig-
mficantly." First, the definitions of the crimes over which the court
has jurisdiction need to be concrete with very little room for inter-
194. See Levitine, supra note 21, at 28 (noting that the United States, in the past,
recognized the need to keep heads of state free from individual prosecution for the
good of the state).
195. See SUNGA, supra note 29, at 300 (explaining that the interests of the inter-
national community may not be the same as those of a particular country). For ex-
ample, the Rwandan judiciary wanted to try all persons responsible for the geno-
cide, while the Tribunal focused on only those who planned and executed the
genocide. See id. at 301.
196. See Dempsey, supra note 19 (arguing that the ICC will be an "avoidable
participant of the national legal process"); see also Pentagon Briefing, available in
1998 WL 171033 (Apr. 14, 1998) (asserting the importance of a clear differentia-
tion between a sovereign nation's legal system and the international court).
197. Rome Treaty, supra note 7, art. 17; see also 1998 Hearing, supra note 1
(statement by Lee A. Casey & David B. Rivkin, Jr.) (describing this as an "open
invitation" to attack American decisions).
198. A C'riminal Court for the World, ECONOMIST, Dec. 6, 1997, at 20 (predict-
ing that the court will fail "if too much is expected from it").
199. See 1998 Hearing, supra note 1 (statement of Sen. John Ashcroft) (stating
"we must never trade away American sovereignty and the Bill of Rights so that
international bureaucrats can sit [in] judgment of the United States military and our
criminal justice system"); see also id. (statement of Sen. Jesse Helms) (finding that
the ICC "represents a massive dilution of the UN Security Council's powers-and
of the United States' veto power within the Security Council").
200. See id. (statement of Sen. Jesse Helms) (concluding that the "Rome Treaty
is irreparably flawed").
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pretation. ' Since the delegations are going to meet to establish the
specific elements of the crimes,"' they can tailor the definitions to
avoid the possibilities of frivolous claims. Although there is the pos-
sibility that by narrowing the definitions some crimes will be left out,
the presence of broad definitions would also not be beneficial.''
Broad definitions allow for too much discretion on the part of the
court." Furthermore, by spreading out its resources by prosecuting a
large range of crimes, the court may not be able to effectively pro-
mote justice any area.205
Second, the Rome Treaty should allow states to attach reservations
to the Rome Treaty."° Perhaps if countries could attach reservations,
the United States would not have voiced its opposition to the Rome
Treaty. 0 7 For example, the United States ratified Genocide Conven-
tion after attaching a reservation that stated that the Convention is
not self-executing and cannot require legislation or other action that
201. See MacPherson, supra note 17, at 50 (discussing the need for clear, unam-
biguous definitions).
202. See Rome Treaty, supra note 7, art. 9(l) (allowing for the elements of the
crimes to be adopted by a two-thirds majority of the members of the Assembly of
States Parties).
203. See McKeon, supra note 62, at 551 (mentioning the need for the final stat-
ute to not leave any doubt as to what constitutes a crime).
204. See Dempsey, supra note 19 (criticizing the inclusion of aggression as ty-
ing the hands of the United States policy makers and noting that "aggression"
could be interpreted to criminalize preemptive military strikes and naval block-
ades); see also MacPherson, supra note 17, at 51 (stating "fairness demands that
due notice be given of what is required before punishment can be meted out").
205. See Dempsey, supra note 19 (explaining that expanding the court's juris-
diction would not be beneficial); see also Jamison, supra note 193, at 435 (arguing
that it would be better to have only a few crimes defined, and make sure that all
member states are bound by them).
206. See 1998 Hearing, supra note 1 (statement of David J. Scheffer, Ambassa-
dor-at-Large for War Crimes Issues) (stressing the need for reservations to rectify
conflicts with domestic constitutional requirements).
207. See LILLICH & HANNUM, supra note 67, at 239 (stating that the United
States has a poor ratification record of human rights treaties); see also Thomas W.
Lippman, Worldwide War Crimes High Court is Approved Delegates Overrule US
Objections, WASH. POST, July 18, 1998, at Al (mentioning that this is second time
in two years the United States rejected major international humanitarian agree-
ment). The Clinton Administration also rejected the treaty that banned the use of
antipersonnel land mines, arguing that United States troops still need such mines in
some places for protection. See id.
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the Constitution prohibits.20' Unfortunately, Article 120 of the Rome
Treaty prevents the United States from protecting its constitutionalo '"09
interests with a reservation.: Even though the attachment of reser-
vations may weaken the ICC in some respects, forbidding them lim-
its the number of signatories. '0 Since the Clinton Administration has
pledged its support for the principles behind the ICC,2 " the allowance
of such reservations would facilitate permanent support from and
ratification by the United States.' 2
Third, the ICC should be responsible to a higher authority.2" For
instance, the five permanent Security Council members could retain
veto rights over the prosecutor's indictments. 4 A Security Council
veto right would allow for supervision over the ICC.2'5 The United
States could ensure that frivolous and politically-motivated claims,
which would serve to inhibit the United States from maintaining its
peacekeeping role in the world, would not be filed. : " This would
208. See S. REP. No. 100-333, at 1-2 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4156-57 (describing the legislative history of the Genocide Convention Imple-
mentation Act of 1987).
209. See Rome Treat,, supra note 7, art. 120 (forbidding reservations to the
Treaty).
210. See 1998 Hearing, supra note I (statement of David J. Scheffer, Ambassa-
dor-at-Large for War Crimes Issues) (citing the provision forbidding reservations
as one reason why the United States did not sign the Treaty).
211. See Kenneth Roth, Sidelined on Human Rights: America Bows Out, 77
FOREIGN AFF., Mar./Apr. 1998, at 2, 3 (discussing that President Clinton endorsed
the ICC in principle). The United States played an integral role in drafting trial
procedures and defining the rights of the defendants. See id.
212. See 1998 Hearing, supra note 1 (statement of David J. Scheffer, Ambassa-
dor-at-Large for War Crimes Issues) (noting that the United States is obliged to
object to some provisions due to constitutional and judicial concerns).
213. See McKeon, supra note 62, at 559 (emphasizing the need to prevent the
arbitrary use of the court).
214. See id. (arguing that subordinating the court to the Security Council would
be a good idea because the court can ensure the obligation of the ICC to maintain
international peace and security).
215. See id. (reasoning that the Security Council would provide political backing
to the court's decisions).
216. See Christopher Lockwood, International: US Fails to Halt JJ'ar Crimnes
Court, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), July 18, 1998 (discussing how the United
States faces a real danger of other countries using the ICC for propaganda pur-
poses); see also Mitchell, supra note 19, at Al (reporting that even with the veto
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protect the United States against the possibility of rogue states
banding together against it in this international forum.27 Although
critics of this veto power argue that it could hamper the ICC,18 the
Security Council effectively established the ad hoc tribunals without
this problem.2 9 The prosecutor would still be strong and the court
could effect justice even if the Security Council retained veto
power.22° In this scenario, all parties could benefit from the ICC.
There would be a greater chance that the United States would par-
ticipate in the ICC's establishment, adding financial stability and in-
ternational credibility in return.221
These three suggestions would serve to ensure more protection for
the interests of the United States. Since the treaty has not entered into
force yet, it is possible that the international community can still
amend the articles. In that case, the world would benefit by a court
that would be free from politicization.
CONCLUSION
The United States has maintained the firm position that the ICC, as
created by the Rome Treaty, would not be in the nation's interest.22'
power, the ICC could still be politically motivated).
217. See Scheffer, supra note 23 (emphasizing that the Security Council is the
United Nations' primary body to deal with peace and security). In cases where the
ICC will undermine the Security Council's authority, there should be some protec-
tion to prevent this result. See id.
218. See Roth, supra note 211, at 4 (explaining that the veto power would leave
little room for the prosecutor to make contemporaneous and independent deci-
sions). The veto power also has the potential of making the indictment process po-
litical. See id. But see supra notes 162-186 and accompanying text (explaining that
the veto power may actually prevent the prosecutor from acting out of political
considerations).
219. See Scheffer, supra note 23 (discussing the shift in judicial intervention).
The United States was at the forefront of creating the ad hoc tribunals. See id.
220. See McKeon, supra note 62, at 559 (discussing how the Security Council
veto would alleviate concerns that the ICC could infringe upon state sovereignty).
221. See Roth, supra note 211, at 6 (stressing the importance of United States in
financially and politically backing the court).
222. See generally 1998 Hearing, supra note 1 (statement of David J. Scheffer,
Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues) (listing the United States' concerns
regarding a strong independent prosecutor).
223. See id. (discussing the changes that the international community needs to
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It is crucial that the United States not waver on its position and con-
tinue to demand change. Whereas some critics argue that this
"hard-line" position will only result in the United States' absence in
the establishment of the court's procedure and selection of the
judges,25 it is important that, in the eyes of the international commu-
nity, the United States not appear to be giving in to pressure. " The
United States needs to maintain a strong image in the international
arena.27 In turn, the need for maintaining its position, coupled with
make before the United States can support the Treaty).
224. Many legislators have already voiced their stringent opposition to the ICC.
See Jesse Helms, COMMENT & ANALYSIS: l'e Must Slav This Monster, FIN.
TIMES, July 31, 1998, at 18 ("we must be aggressively opposed [to the Treaty] be-
cause, even if the U.S. never joins the court, the Rome Treaty will have serious
implications for U.S. foreign policy"); see also 1998 Hearing, supra note I (state-
ment of Sen. Rod Grams) (urging that the Clinton Administration actively oppose
the Rome Treaty, so that it fails like the League of Nations). Senator Helms has
gone as far as to threaten to renegotiate the United States military commitments
abroad. See Eric Schmitt, Pentagon Plans for hIternational War Crimes Tribunal,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1998, at Al I (discussing how in early April, the Defense
Department called more than 100 foreign military attaches to warn of the dangers
of a permanent international criminal court). The Defense Department cautioned
the attaches that if the court was set up and not properly restrained, the court could
target their own soldiers. See id. (emphasizing that the Defense Department fears
that the soldiers would be in jeopardy when they are acting in a peacekeeping ca-
pacity); see also 1998 Hearing, supra note I (statement of Sen. Jesse Helms)
(threatening that the Clinton administration will have to renegotiate the military
agreements with every ICC signatory state where American soldiers are stationed).
Furthermore, some argue that the international community should defer to the
United States' wishes due to its oft-deployed military assistance. See Lippman, su-
pra note 207, at Al (describing the American position as "we're the ones who re-
spond when the world dials 911, and if you want us to keep responding, you
should accommodate our views").
225. See 1998 Hearing, supra note 1 (statement of Michael P. Scharf, Director,
Center for International Law and Policy, New England School of Law) (warning
that even though the United States did not sign the Treaty, United States citizens
will be bound by it when they go abroad). By not signing the Treaty, however, the
United States cannot participate in the preparatory committee that will draft the
Court's rules and procedure and further define the elements in the jurisdiction. See
id. In addition, the United States will be unable to nominate a candidate for the
court. See id. (determining that the United States has lost more than its won by
voting against the Treaty).
226. See Kofi Annan, UN-Secretary General Urges "Like-Minded'" States to
Ratify the Statute of the International Criminal Court, M2 PRESSWIRE, Sept. 2,
1998 (calling for the United States and other countries to sign the Treaty).
227. See 1998 Hearing, supra note 1 (statement of Sen. John Ashcroft) (stating
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the importance of its military role, should encourage the United
States to continue to negotiate with the international community to
change the Rome Treaty appropriately. 228
that "America's ideals and values are ascendant in the post Cold War world").
228. See 1998 Hearing, supra note 1 (statement of David J. Scheffer, Ambassa-
dor-at-Large for War Crimes Issues) (expressing hope for potential United States
participation in the future if changes are made in the Treaty).
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